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NOTE
RECENT STATUTORY REGULATION OF CONSUMER SALES
FINANCING AS EXEMPLIFIED BY AUTOMOBILE
SALES ACTS
If A, having no ready cash, wishes to buy an automobile, at least
two ways are available to finance the sale. (1) He may borrow from a
third person and pay the seller in cash. (2) He may buy on the installment
plan at a price higher than the cash price, the difference being the finance
charge for the seller's extension of credit. In essence the two transactions
are the same; they permit A to obtain present goods in return for his
obligation to pay in the future. At common law the usury laws would
prevent an exorbitant charge in the first situation, but not in the second.
The reason given by the courts for this distinction was that a sale of goods
is not a loan and there can be no usury in the absence of'a loan., This
distinction enabled the installment seller, by virtue of his superior bar-
gaining position, to charge interest rates, termed "finance charges," that
were grossly in excess of a return commensurate with the costs and risks
of extending credit to the buyer. The purpose of this Note is to explore
the many abuses which the installment selling of consumer goods, especially
automobiles, has engendered, and to evaluate the statutory remedies passed
to curb them.
The exorbitant finance charge is probably the most significant prob-
lem raised by installment selling, as it confronts the buyer as soon as the
installment payments begin. In addition, other abuses are prevalent in
this field. Sellers often do not disclose the full terms of the contract to
the buyer but instead have him sign a "blank" contract in which harsh
terms are subsequently inserted, to the buyer's surprise. When the buyer
defaults the goods are often repossessed without prior notice and his
right to the goods is cut off forthwith regardless of his equity in them.2
1. This reasoning has been followed in a long line of decisions stemming from
the early English case of Beete v. Bidgood, [1828] 7 B. & C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep.
792 (1827). See e.g., Hogg v. Ruffner, 1 Black 115 (U.S. 1-861); Thomas v.
Knickerbocher Operating Co., 108 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Morris Plan In-
dustrial Bank of Schenectady v. Faulds, 269 App. Div. 238, 55 N.Y.S.2d 372 (3d
Dep't 1945). For a discussion of this subject, see Berger, Us'ury in Instalment
Sales, 2 LAW & CONTIMP. PROB. 148, 172 (1935).
2. See a general discussion of all the above-cited evils and abuses in Nugent
and Henderson, Installment Selling and the Consumner: A Brief for Regulation,
173 ANNALS 93 (1934). Certainly the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (hereinafter
cited U.C.S.A., provides inadequate protection from the abuses of installment sell-
ing. It was written several years before their prevalence and before the advent
of the finance company in automobile financing. At the time of the Act's passage,
conditional sales contracts were used mainly in commercial sales between manufac-
turers and purchasers of goods in large quantities. The act does deal with reposses-
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The entrance of the finance company into the field as the assignee of the
installment contract creates many new problems. The buyer is sometimes
prevented from asserting contract defenses, such as breach of warranty,
against the finance company's collection of payments on the assigned con-
tract. A more widespread abuse is the finance company's insistence upon
the execution of a note by the buyer, which, because it is generally held
to be negotiable, cuts off as to the endorsee finance company the buyer's
contract defenses against the original seller.3
The importance of installment selling in the principal retail establish-
ments is shown by the following table:
The percentage of Installment Sales to Total Sales in each field, 1929-1946.
Automobiles Furniture Household Appliances Jewelry
60 40 50 21
The dominant position of automobile installment sales is indicated as fol-
lows: 4
Percentage Distribution of all Installment Credit by Six Types of Retail
Establishments, 1929-1946.
Department Household All
Automobiles Stores Furniture Appliances Jewelry Others Total
51.6 12.5 15.5 9.5 2.3 8.6 100
The vast growth of the automobile industry brought about a novel method
of marketing to distribute automobiles to the consumer. Mass production
had brought with it an enormous expansion of installment credit without
which the mass buying of automobiles would not have been possible.
However, the dealer-seller was unable to grant credit on such a large
scale. To fill this need the finance company emerged in American economic
life to take the key position in granting consumer credit.
sion, redemption and resale. However, as will be discussed below, some of these
provisions seem unsuited for modern retail installment selling.
An example of such a provision is that which permits the seller to cut off the
buyer's right of redemption merely by serving advance notice of intention to repossess
the goods (§ 18). The inadequacy of the Act as applied to the modern consumer
safe is pointed out in Donaldson, Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 19 ROCKY
MT. L. REv. 135, 158 (1947).
3. See Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J.
1341, 1350 (1948). See also Notes, 44 Ii.. L. Rrv. 227, 230 (1949), 57 YALE L.J.
1414 (1948) which discuss the attempts to make installment sales contracts them-
selves negotiable as well as cases in which buyer has executed a separate promissory
note.
4. The figures for these two tables were compiled from data in Cox, THE
ECONOMICS OF INSTALMENT BUYING 24-33 (1948) and RETAIL INSTALLMENT SELL-
ING, REsEARCia REPORT 16, RESEARCH Dir. MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 10-13
(1940). From 1929 to 1949 the volume of installment sales credit exceeded the
total of all other forms of consumer credit such as installment loans and single-
payment loans. See Cox, mspra, at 485-489.
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The problems created by installment selling are complicated by the
many different types of security interests which sellers use. Historically,
different legal consequences follow, depending upon whether the security
device used by the seller in the installment sales contract is a conditional
sale, a bailment lease or a chattel mortgageP These three common forms
of installment contract differ as to the procedure which the seller follows
in exerting his rights in the event of default." They often differ in the
rights and defenses remaining in the buyer in the event of default. For
example, in Pennsylvania, an installment buyer formerly had very little
protection against harsh repossession practices because the seller commonly
employed the "bailment lease", which is exempt from the coverage of the
Pennsylvania version of the Conditional Sales Act.7  Although courts are
naturally antagonistic to harsh contract provisions and might be led to
find some grounds on which to hold for the buyer, nevertheless buyers
have often acquiesced because they had neither the money nor inclination
to go to court.
There is no reason why the relative rights of both the seller and buyer
in the retail transaction should not be the same regardless of which form
of security device is used. This thought is reflected in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code 8 and in the states which have passed special legislation to
protect the installment buyer in the retail sale situation. These acts are
couched in broad enough terms to include all types of security devices
5. Some form of security device or title retention is universally used by the
installment seller. It permits the seller to threaten to repossess or actually re-
possess goods in the event of nonpayment. A bailment lease is an arrangement by
which goods are hired for a specified period, the bailee ordinarily having an option
to buy the goods for a nominal sum after all the installments have been paid. A
conditional sale is a sale conditioned upon the buyer's payment of the purchase
price; the buyer has possession of the goods and seller can repossess only in the event
of buyer's default. In a chattel mortgage arrangement the buyer obtains present
title as well as possession. The buyer then transfers back to the seller a limited
security interest in the goods, which seller may exercise, by foreclosure, in the event
of default by the buyer.
6. In the few states where the bailment lease is used, notably Pennsylvania,
the seller has an effective method of self help. He is bound to no formal methods
of repossession. This was also true when the conditional sale was employed prior
to the U.C.S.A. However, the conditional seller was commonly subjected to the
rule of election. He had to choose between suing for the price or disaffirming the
transaction through repossession. In the chattel mortgage situation foreclosure is
often a cumbersome process for seller. But the doctrine of election does not generally
apply against the mortgagee. See HANNA, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECUarrY
254-255 (2d ed. 1952) : 1 WILISToN SALES §§ 336-338 (2d ed. 1924); 2 id. §§ 579-
579(a).
7. Compare § 1 of the U.C.S.A. with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 361 (Purdon
1931). In addition to being subject to lessor's right of self-help, the lessee is not
permitted to raise lessor's breach of warranty as a defense to an action for repos-
session by lessor. The cases imply that the lessee will be held to the terms of the
contract and have no period of redemption following repossession. See Lee-Strauss
Co. v. Kelly, 292 Pa. 403, 141 Atl. 236 (1928); Judson C. Burns, Inc. v. Weinberg,
119 Pa. Super. 571, 181 Atl. 460 (1935) ; Valicenti v. Central Motors, Inc. 115 Pa.
Super. 74, 174 Atl. 799 (1934).
8. UNIFORM COMmERCiAL CODE Art. 9 (Official Draft 1952) (hereinafter cited
U.C.C.). For a discussion of the Secured Transactions article of the Code see
Schwartz, Pennsylvania Chattel Security and the Uniform Coinercial Code, 98 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 530 (1950) ; Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Coin-
mericat Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. Paoa. 27 (1951).
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employed by the seller.9 Some of these statutes apply whether or not the
seller retains any form of security interest in the goods sold.' 0
In recent years thirteen states, recognizing the need for counter-
balancing the installment buyer's inferior bargaining power, have passed
legislation aimed at placing him in a more advantageous position. These
statutes vary considerably in their approach as well as in their coverage."
Five of them apply only to the sale of automobiles,' 2 while the remainder
apply to all goods. The remedial provisions of these statutes will be ex-
amined and compared with the Uniform Conditional Sales Act ' 3 and the
new Uniform Commercial Code.
THE CONTRACT DOCUMENT
Requiring the terms to be in writing.-A major criticism of install-
ment selling generally, and especially of automobile installment selling,
has been that the buyer often was ignorant of his rights and liabilities
under the contract. Either no written contract was ever executed by the
parties or the seller had the buyer sign a blank contract in which the seller
9. See e.g., the Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 600-637 (Purdon
1951) which defines an installment sales contract as, ". . . any contract for the re-
tail sale of a motor vehicle, . . . under which part or all of the price is payable
in two or more scheduled payments subsequent to the making of such contract, . . .
and shall include any loan, any mortgage, any conditional sale contract, any purchase-
money chattel mortgage, any hire-purchase agreement . . ." Section 603 (10).
10. OHIo GEN. CoDE ANN. § 6346-15 (Page Supp. 1952); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 69, § 603 (Purdon Supp. 1951).
11. Two states have disclosure laws which prescribe what information must be
included within the written contract. CAr Civ. CoDE §§ 2981-82 (1949) ; N.Y. PE~s.
PROP. LAW §§ 64-a, 80-b, 81. The Utah statute merely subjects the installment sale
to the Usury laws. UTAH Con ANN. tit. 44, § 44-0-2 (1943). The remaining states
have more comprehensive statutes regulating every phase of the installment sales
transaction. CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. §§ 5963-68, 6698-6704 (1949) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 58-901-34 (Bums 1951); Mz. REv. STAT. c. 56, §264 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE
GFN. LAws art. 83, §§ 116-52 (Cum. Supp. 1947); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 255,
§511-13 H (Cum. Supp. 1951); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.415 (Cum. Supp. 1951);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16 B (1950); OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. f§6346-15-27, 9589-5
(Page Supp. 1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§600-637 (Purdon Supp. 1951);
Wis. STAT. § 218.01 (1947). See also HAWAII REv. LAWS §§9141-69 (1945);
Hire-Purchase Act, 1938, 1 & 2 GEo. 6, c. 53. Hereinafter specific provisions in these
state statutes are referred to by state name and section number.
12. California, Maine, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. The Massa-
chusetts and Ohio statutes apply to all installment sales. The other statutes that
apply to all goods limit this coverage to sales below a maximum price. These
limitations do not impede the effectiveness of the statutes, which are aimed at pro-
tecting the consumer rather than the commercial buyer. See N.Y. PERs. PROP.
LAW § 64-a, which regulates the contents of installment sales contracts, and exempts
goods sold for commercial use.
13. The U.C.S.A., withdrawn from active promulgation by the Commissioners
in 1943, has been adopted, with variations in some states, in the following jurisdic-
tions: ALAsKA COMP. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, c. 2, §§ 1-28 (1949); ARIz. CoDE ANN.
c. 52, §§ 601-620 (1939); DE-L. REv. CoDE c. 173, §§ 5951-5979 (1935); HAWAII
REv. LAws § 9141-9169 (1945); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-801 to 58-829 (Burns
1951); N.H. Laws c. 104, §§ 1-32 (1945); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, c. 32, §§ 1-33
(1940); N.Y. PERS. PRoP. LAw, §§60-81; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§361-504
(Purdon 1931); S.D. CODE §§ 54.0201-54.0229 (1939); Wis. STAT. c. 122, f501-31
(1947); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 4007-4038 (1949).
1953]
534 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
subsequently placed oppressive contract terms. The buyer had no idea
what the various charges were that made up the total price of the goods
or how they were calculated. He often did not understand under what
conditions the goods would be repossessed until the repossessor con-
fronted him:44  This policy of nondisclosure precluded the buyer from
being able properly to compare purchasing on time with other means of
obtaining the goods, such as borrowing money from a bank or saving until
he could make a cash purchase.15 To eliminate these evils, eleven of'the
thirteen states '6 now require the entire contract to be in writing setting
forth the unpaid balance of the cash price, the various finance and insur-
ance charges, the buyer's liability respecting default and repossession and
his right to redeem the goods. Several states further provide that the
contract must contain a prominently printed caveat to buyers not to
sign the contract in blank and a statement that the buyer is entitled to an
exact copy of the document."7 These disclosure provisions are often ac-
companied by sanctions invalidating the contract, in whole or part, for
the seller's failure to comply with the statute.' 8 In the main these sanctions
have been strictly enforced against the seller or contract holder.'?
Finance Charges.-The most talked-about abuse connected with in-
stallment selling is the seller's exorbitant finance charge. Despite this
14. For 'general discussion of the above mentioned abuses brought about by the
buyer's unawareness of contract terms, see, Nugent and Henderson, Installment
Selling and the Consumer: A Brief for Regulation, 173 ANNALS 93 (1934) ;" Donald-
son, Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 19 RocKY MT. L. R~v. 135, 142 (1947)
Note, Protecting the Installment Buyer, 49 HARv. L. Rav. 128 (1935).
15. Undoubtedly one of the most important influences curbing the volume of in-
stallment selling and, therefore, the number of abuses in it during the past few
years has been Regulation W of the Federal Reserve Board. It was first promul-
gated as a defense measure, under a presidential order, and was intended to help
prevent inflation afid discourage purchases of consumer goods during the war.
Exec. Order No. 8843, Aug. 9,1941, 3 CODE FED. REas. c. 2 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
It controlled over-extension of credit by prescribing a one-third down payment on all
installment sales of automobiles and a fifteen percent down payment on all installment
sales of household effects. The time balance on all of these sales was limited to
eighteen months. 32 A CoDE FED. ERos. c. 15 (Rev. ed. 1951). To the extent that
these regulations prevented financially irresponsible buyers from purchasing on time,
they eliminated many buyers who would have been subjected to the abuses at which
modern sales legislation is directed. Regulation W was withdrawn from operation
in May, 1952.
16. Maine and Utah are the exceptions.
17. E.g., MARYLAND, § 117(c).
18. MASSACHUSETTS, §§ 12, 13 A (vendee shall have valid defense against re-
covery of finance charge by vendor in the event of non-compliance with written
contract provision, and no contract shall be valid unless it apprises buyer of his
rights upon default); MARYLAND, § 136 (seller shall not collect any finance or de-
linquency charge) ; MICHIGAN § 19.415(2) (seller shall not collect any finance
charge).
19. See, e.g., Lehan v. North Main St. Garage, Inc., 312 Mass. 547, 45 N.E.2d
945 (1942) holding that seller, who did not comply with statute invalidating sales
contract unless it apprises buyer of his rights upon default, lost his security title and
therefore could not recover for conversion of automobile against buyer's transferee.
In Stride v. Martin, 184 Md. 446, 41 A.2d 489 (1945) a copy of the contract de-
livered to buyer was not signed by seller as the statute required [MARYLAND,
§ 116(c)]. The Court held that the buyer was entitled to recover all payments made,
after seller had "repossessed."
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fact only six states have directly dealt with the problem by establishing
maximum rates which the seller may charge.20  These states have recog-
nized that the policy behind usury laws and their offshoot, the small loans
acts, applies in the installment selling field. 21. Maximum rates are higher
than ordinary loan rates, in recognition of the increased risk involved in
investigations, making collections, obtaining insurance, and depreciation
of the chattel.22  Most of these states, in providing only one maximum
charge, do not take into account the difference in credit risk between new
or relatively new articles and old ones due to the higher rate of deprecia-
tion on older goods. The Pennsylvania act, applying only to automobiles,
is novel in that it sets up three different allowable maximum charges ac-
cording to the age of the automobile sold.
23
Writers have claimed that the exorbitant finance charge is caused
in part by the competition among finance companies to obtain the retail
sellers' business.24  To gain more dealer business, many finance com-
panies have adopted the practice of rebating part of the finance charge to
the retailer. The successful competitors are the ones that give the seller
the largest rebate or "pack." Economists have advocated, and one state
has adopted, provisions forbidding the dealer from receiving more than a
stated maximum rebate when he assigns an installment contract.2 The
theories behind condemning or restricting rebates are: (1) the" buyer does
20. CALIFORNIA, § 2982(c); INDIANA, § 906; OHIO, § 6346-20; PENNSYLVANIA,
§6191; UTAH, §44-0-2. In Wisconsin the Banking Commission requires finance
companies to file maximum rate charts. If the Commission thinks that these rates
are reasonable it has the power to prevent companies from exceeding them. Donald-
son, Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 19 RocKy MT. L. REv. 135, 146 (1947).
21. "Both transactions result in a contract for the future delivery of money."
Berger Usury in, Instalment Sales, 2 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 148, 153 (1935).
22. See Ecker, Commentary on "Usury in Itstabment Sales," 2 LAW & CONTEI.-P.
PROB. 173, 176 (1935). Utah fixes maximum interest rates for both loans and credit
sales under the same statutory provision. UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 44, § 44-0-2 (1943).
Methods of computation of rates, based upon seller's risks, and their relative
merits are discussed in Mors, State Regidation of Retail Installment Financing-
Progress and Problems, 24 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS OF THE UN-vERSITY OF CHICAGo
48 (Jan. 1, 1951).
23. The maximum rates are as follows: New automobiles, six percent per year;
Used automobiles not more than two years old, nine percent per year; Used
automobiles over two years old, twelve percent per year. PENNSYLVANIA, § 619.
In Indiana the Department of Financial Institutions is empowered to fix maximum
rates and has set up classes for automobile sales similar to Pennsylvania. Donald-
son, supra note 20, at 145. Mors, supra note 22, says of the Pennsylvania method
of having three categories of charges, at 50: "(1) they permit application of the
step rate idea in allowing for wide variations in loan size. (2) they permit the
state to isolate the field which accounts for the bulk of the money volume of retail
installment financing and in which legislative committees have found the greatest
relative concentration of abuses. (3) they recognize the peculiar importance of the
second hand market for cars in determining the lending risks and hence in influencing
maximum rate considerations."
24. See, e.g., Nugent and Henderson, supra note 2, at 98; Cavers, The Consuner's
Stake in the Finaiwe Company Code Controversy, 2 LAW & CONTEI I. PRoB. 200
(1935).
25. See Nugent and Henderson, supra note 2, at 98. The Ohio statute fixes the
dealer's rebate at two percent of the principal balance of the contract, § 6346-22. The
Indiana statute provides that the department may fix maximum dealer rebates,
§ 58-910.
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not realize that the dealer is taking an undisclosed profit; and (2) since
the dealer acquires immediate cash by assigning the contract, he does not
deserve the rebate. However, regulating the dealer rebate is complicated
by the several types of dealer-finance company contracts which are prev-
alent. Each type would require its own maximum limit, because they
vary according to the services performed by the dealer and the extent of
recourse the finance company has against the dealer in the event of default
by the buyer.26 Pennsylvania and Maryland, with very extensive install-
ment sales legislation, do not prohibit the dealer from receiving a rebate
from the finance company, and their policy of non-interference seems
preferable. The only justification advanced for such regulation is that
it helps to protect the buyer. However, if the maximum finance charge
is fixed, and legislation prescribes that such charge shall be clearly dis-
closed on the face of the contract, it seems that the buyer is adequately
protected against the exorbitant charge.27  It is submitted that the buyer
is afforded no further protection by control of the manner in which dealer
and his assignee divide the finance charge. As a practical matter it is
very difficult to prevent the finance company from presenting a dealer with
an occasional "gift."
Assuming that full disclosure and fixing the maximum charge ade-
quately protects the uninformed buyer by preventing exorbitant charges,
a more important question appears: Do the statutes provide a clear method
for stating the finance charge in the contract? All but two of the states
having installment sales legislation 28 require the total finance charge to
be stated separately in the contract. This enables the buyer to ascertain
immediately the additional cost of buying on time. The finance charge in
the installment sales statutes is generally calculated as a fixed yearly per-
centage of the original unpaid balance of the sale.29 Since the unpaid
balance declines as installment payments are made, but the interest rate
remains constant, the original percentage upon which the charge is cal-
culated is about one-half the actual yearly interest rate. For purposes of
helping the buyer to compare installment purchasing with other methods
of financing, it would be more desirable to require that the contract state
the interest rate per year, as the well known usury laws do. This would
drive home to the buyer the fact that installment purchasing is substan-
tially more expensive than financing through a direct loan of money.30
26. For a discussion of the division of duties in the various types of dealer-
finance company contracts, see Adelson, The Mechanics of the Instal ent Credit
Sale, 2 LAw & CoNTmap. PROB. 218, 220-222 (1935).
27. The Maryland statute does not fix the maximum finance charge. The policy
judgment seems to be that merely requiring full disclosure will sufficiently protect
the buyer, since the normal law of supply and demand will operate once the buyer
knows what he is getting into.
28. The exceptions are Maine and Utah.
29. E.g., Oxio, § 6346-20; PENNSYLVANIA, § 619 B.
30. The statutes proceed on the theory that all allowable charges must be
separately stated in the contract. But in trying to inform the buyer fully, they
require the seller to list certain initial charges in the contract which, when inserted
REGULATION OF CONSUMER SALES FINANCING
The states that require a written installment contract usually require
that it shall contain all the agreements of the parties.3 ' This means the
seller must set forth the rate of additional charges to the buyer in event
of his default. Surveys show that exorbitant default and repossession
charges, of which the buyer was not aware until the default occurred, have
constituted a major abuse in installment selling.3 2  Several states go fur-
ther than merely providing that the conditions of default must appear
in the contract, and set maximum limits on these charges. 33
Insurance.-Unversally, the seller requires accident insurance to
protect the security interest which he and his assignee have in the auto-
mobile.3 4 Before the enactment of the modern legislation, the buyer often
did not get full information on either the coverage or the cost of the in-
surance policy. Sellers would lump the insurance cost together with finance
and other charges and this concealment facilitated the seller's taking a
very handsome commission on the writing of the buyer's insurance. Sellers
were often prompted more by considerations of which insurance company
gave seller the largest commission or condoned his raising the premium
rate than by considerations of the financial stability of an insurance com-
pany and the broadest coverage for the buyer.35 Today most of the states
requiring a written contract require that the cost of insurance to the
buyer and a brief summary of its coverage be separately stated in the
contract.3 6 They also require a copy of the insurance policy to be fur-
nished the buyer shortly after the installment contract is signed. Penn-
sylvania and Michigan provide that the buyer may choose his own in-
surers. This provision would seem to help eliminate the practice of the
seller's charging insurance rates higher than those generally charged by
insurance companies for comparable coverage. However, since neither
state requires that the installment contract set forth the buyer's right to
procure his own insurance, he may never know of this right.
in addition to the more significant charges, unduly lengthen and complicate it: These
include filing fees, notarization fees, and, if a motor vehicle, registration and
driver's license fees. Preventing the seller from charging more than the actual costs
of these fees and expenses can be accomplished just as effectively by raising the
maximum finance charge to the extent of such costs and forbidding the separate
statement of these charges. By this means the contract may be simplified without
depriving the buyer of any statutory protection.
31. See, e.g., MICHIGAN, § 19.415(2). This prevents the seller from taking
advantage of the lack-of-integration exception to the parol evidence rule.
32. See Nugent and Henderson, supra note 2, at 96; RETAIL INSTALLMENT
SEtLING, RESEARCH REPORT 16, .mpra note 4, at 29.
33. CONNECICUT, § 6699; INDiANA, § 58-926(c) ; MARYLAND, § 132; Naw JERSm,
§17:16B-6, OHIO, §6346-20; PENNSYLVANIA, §621. Several of these statutes permit
these charges to be imposed only after a default of a certain number of days.
34. As between the parties the risk of loss is usually placed upon the buyer.
See U.C.S.A. §27. Under a bailment lease where property is destroyed through
no fault of the bailee, he is not liable in the absence of a contract provision enlarging
his liability so that he is an insurer. McCoy v. Home Ins. Co., 170 Pa. Super. 38,
84 A.2d 249 (1951).
35. Seller is only interested in obtaining coverage for the goods, whereas the
buyer might desire personal liability insurance.
36. E.g., PENNSYLVANIA, § 614B (4).
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Although most states regulate maximum insurance rates and license
insurance agents, these regulations do not answer the question of whether
or not the retail seller is allowed to charge for handling the procurement
of insurance for the buyer. Maryland is the only state which directly
answers this question negatively.37 Many states permit the seller to list
incidental charges in the contract representing expenses by the seller in
carrying out the contract.3 8 It is conceivable that sellers make extra in-
surance charges through such expense clauses.
PROHIBITED CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Installment sales legislation has prohibited a number of contract clauses
which are unnecessary to protect the seller's interests while being unduly
oppressive to the buyer. Pennsylvania and Maryland forbid insecurity
clauses under which any part or all of the unmatured time balance may be
declared immediately due because the seller or assignee deems himself
insecure.39 The harshness of such clauses has been minimized by courts
that have required reasonable ground for fear rather than mere apprehen-
sion before enforcing them against the buyer.40 In cases of actual default
by the buyer, every state but Maryland 4 ' allows a seller or holder to im-
pose a contract clause declaring the entire balance due.
Buyers frequently have had to acquiesce in contract provisions au-
thorizing forcible entry, with an accompanying waiver of damages, in
repossession of the goods or in the collection of payments. Such provi-
sions are forbidden by the Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes.42  These
states also prevent a seller or his assignee from relieving himself of lia-
bility for acts of his agents through a contract provision whereby, the
buyer executes a power of attorney appointing the seller as the buyer's
agent in collection of payments or in repossession of goods.43  Moreover,
they outlaw the "balloon" contract which precipitates default and repos-
session by providing for small periodical payments, terminating in one very
large payment.
44
Several states prohibit a clause giving the seller or assignee a power
of attorney to appear for the buyer and confess judgment upon default,
in view of buyer's inequality of bargaining power.45  The importance of
37. MARYLAND, § 119(a). Cf. PENNSYLVANIA, § 617(c) which provides that
the insurance charge shall not be in excess of the cost others pay for similar. coverage.
38. See note 30 supra.
39. MARYLAND, § 118(d) ; PENNSYLVANIA, § 615B.
40. E.g., Hines v. Pacific Car Co., 110 Wash. 75, 188 Pac. 29 (1920). 3
JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 1296 (6th ed. 1933).
41. MARYLAND, §129(1).
42. MARYLAND, § 118 (e); PENNSYLVANIA, § 615 C, D. The statutes do not
specify the sanction for violating this prohibition.
43. MARYLAND, § 118(f); PENNSYLVANIA, § 615 E.
44. MARYLAND, § 118(C); PENNSYLVANIA, § 615 F.
45. E.g., MARYLAND, § 118(b); Nmv JERSEY, § 17:163-6(a) (3). Cf. Wis-
coNsiN, § 270:69, which permits warrants of attorney to confess judgment only on
a bond or promissory note. This statute has been construed to prohibit entering
a judgment on a warrant of attorney contained in a conditional sale contract.
Chippewa Valley Securities Co. v. Herbst, 227 Wis. 422, 278 N.W. 872 (1938).
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such protection is lessened, because courts generally closely scrutinize such
clauses and readily open judgments in order that buyer may defend.46
BUYER's DEFENSES AGAINST FINANCE COMPANY
Pennsylvania and Maryland are the only states that deal with the
special problems created by the assignee finance company's intervention.
The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicles Sales Finance Act forbids contract pro-
visions relieving the assignee from liability for any legal remedies which
the buyer may have against the seller under the contract.47 American
case law generally has given the buyer protection against these waiver or
cut-off clauses in sales contracts by declaring them void as against public
policy.48 Nevertheless a number of court decisions have upheld such
waivers against the installment buyer.
49
A more serious impairment of the buyer's rights occurs when the
seller requires the buyer to execute a note evidencing the contract price.
In contradistinction to the general invalidity of waivers of contract breaches
in assignments, the courts have generally held that such notes are ne-
gotiable, with the result that when the endorsee finance company sues
upon the note, the buyer may not set off claims for breach of contract.8 0
Only Pennsylvania and Maryland prohibit the execution of separately ne-
gotiated notes intended to cut off as to the holder in due course any claim
or defense which the buyer has against the original seller.51
These provisions of the Pennsylvania and Maryland acts are similar
to protection given the buyer of consumer goods under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, which declares that a holder in due course of a negotiated
instrument is subject to the buyer's claims or defenses if the holder seeks
to enforce the security interest, and that a clause waiving a claim or defense
upon assignment of the contract is unenforceable.
52
46. Ferris Motors Corp. v. Lebegern, 276 Pa. 395, 120 Atl. 394 (1923); 6
WILLISTON, CoNTcrs § 1724 (Rev. ed. 1938).
47. PENNSYLVANIA, § 615 F.
48. E.g., Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 442
(6th Cir. 1941); San Francisco Securities Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Corp., 25 Ariz.
531, 220 Pac. 229 (1923) ; Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen 162 Wash. 449,
298 Pac. 705 (1931) ; See First Acceptance Corp. v. Kennedy, 95 F. Supp. 861, 878
(N.D. Iowa 1951). Further cases are cited in 3 JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND
CONDITIONAL SALES § 1257 (6th ed. 1933). See Note, Negotiability of Conditional
Sales Contracts: The Consner and Article III of the, Comnwrcial Code, 57 YALE
L.J. 1414 (1948).
49. See cases cited in Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1414 n.7, 8 (1948). For a discussion
of negotiability, citing extensive authority both upholding such clauses and declaring
them invalid, see Comment, 16 WASH. L. REv. 158 (1941).-
50. See Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1414, 1415 n.9; See NIL §§ 52, 57.
51. MARYLAND, § 134; PENNSYLVANiA, § 615 G. These provisions represent a
major departure from negotiable instruments law. See the sections of the NIL cited
in note 50 supra.
52. U.C.C. § 9-206 (1). This protection is given only to buyers of consumer
goods. There is a loophole in the first of these provisions in that the holder may
obtain a judgment on the note and avoid any defense under the sales contract by
proceeding against the buyer, but he may not levy on the goods covered by the
contract.
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It has been said that the disadvantageous positions into which the
buyer may contract himself are more apparent than real.53 Since in most
cases a finance company cannot afford to jeopardize its dealer's reputa-
tion in the community by refusing to allow adjustments for breach of war-
ranty by the dealer, it would be reluctant to use its full contract rights.
Therefore, recourse arrangements between the dealer and finance company,
or an arrangement by which the finance company can withhold payment
to the dealer under a reserve clause, are more commonly used than the
waiver clause or negotiable note.from the buyer.54
CONSEQUENCES OF DEFAULT BY BUYER
In the many states where neither the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
nor modern installment sales legislation is in effect, the buyer has virtually
no rights in the goods after default. By using the bailment lease or con-
ditional sale rather than the chattel mortgage the seller can cut off any
right to redeem the goods after they are repossessed.5 The seller can re-
possess immediately upon default without giving prior notice to the buyer.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act regulates the procedure respecting re-
possession, redemption and resale. However, because this act was enacted
before the major problems of the consumer buyer had appeared, it has
been somewhat ineffectual in curbing abuses.56
Repossession.-The Uniform Act allows the seller to repossess the
goods immediately upon default.57 Of the modern statutes only one re-
quires the seller to give the buyer prior notice before taking possession of
the goods, and that one is limited to household goods. 58 Pennsylvania in-
directly encourages prior notice and leniency by providing that the buyer
may redeem the goods without paying the costs of retaking and repairing
the vehicle if the seller has not waited at least fifteen days after default
before repossessing.59
Redemption.-The Uniform Act is particularly inadequate with regard
to redemption rights. It permits the seller to cut off the buyer's right
to redeem merely by giving prior notice of his intention to repossess.60 .
This is considered appropriate for large commercial sales where the seller
and buyer live in different cities. However, most consumer-buyers, un-
like businessmen, do not realize the seriousness of default until reposses-
53. Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1414, 1417-18 (1948).
54. See note 26 supra.
55. See Cox, THE EcoNomics OF INSTALLMENT BUYING 318-19 (1948); Donald-
son, Retail Itstallment Sales Legislation, 19 Rocmy MT. L. REv. 135, 155 (1947).
For comment on the exorbitant charges for delinquency which are sometimes imposed,
see Nugent and Henderson, supra note 2, at 96-98.
56. See the discussion in the U.C.S.A. in note 2 supra.
57. U.C.S.A. § 16.
58. MASSACHUSETTS, § 13 c.
59. PENNs LvANTA, § 625B2.
60. U.C.S.A. § 16.
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sion actually occurs. Moreover, problems of distance between buyer and
seller which make redemption unworkable in most commercial sales are
absent in the usual consumer sale, where the buyer and seller reside in the
same community. Four states, recognizing these differences, give the
buyer a stated period of redemption, usually fifteen days, not subject to
any limitation by the seller."1 Nevertheless, in every state but Maryland,
the seller may provide in the sales contract for acceleration of all future pay-
ments upon default. Hence, redemption usually means the buyer must pay
all the sums remaining unpaid under the contract and not merely the
amount due at the time of default. The Uniform Commercial Code is
novel in that it establishes no specific redemption period. Instead, it pro-
vides that the buyer may reclaim the goods at any time before resale.
62
The requirement of reasonable notice of time and place of resale apprises
buyer of his redemption period. In cases where the Code authorizes the
seller to retain the goods in satisfaction of the debt, he must notify buyer
of such proposal. The buyer then has thirty days in which to redeem
the goods by paying all sums due under the contract.6 The lack of a
fixed redemption period in the Code would probably give the buyer a longer
redemption period than he now has.
Resale.-Under the Conditional Sales Act, the seller must resell at
public auction within thirty days after repossession when fifty percent or
more of the purchase price has been paid before the goods were retaken,
and must account to the buyer for any excess over price and cost.64 This
forced sale provision may be detrimental to buyers because the proceeds of
such sales are rarely sufficient to cover the unpaid balance, so that a large
deficiency judgment often results.6B5 It has been suggested that it would
be better to give the buyer an option of compelling resale if fifty percent
or more of the price has been paid, so that he may choose between letting
the goods go and reselling with the possible consequence of a deficiency
judgment.66 However, this rule would work to the seller's detriment to
a certain extent, for when a sale is forced upon him he frequently does
not have enough time to shop around for a good price, and the requirement
of a public sale diminishes any proceeds by the amount of the costs.67
These arguments for the seller become less convincing as the buyer's equity
61. MARYLAND, § 129; MASSACHUsnrrs, § 11; MICHIGAN, § 19.415(4); PENN-
SYLVANIA, § 625. Connecticut, Indiana and New York follow the U.C.S.A. and allow
the seller to cut off buyer's redemption right by giving prior notice of repossession.
62. U.C.C. § 9-506.
63. U.C.C. § 9:505 (2).
64. U.C.S.A. § 19. CONNECTICUT, § 6700 (d) ; MICHIGAN, § 19.415(5).
65. See Legis., 63 HARV. L. REv. 874, 880 (1950).
66. Ibid. This option is left with the buyer in MARYLAND, § 130, and MASSA-
cHusEtts, § 13 F. Unless there is a resale as provided by statute the seller cannot
obtain a deficiency judgment against the buyer.
67. Sellers are unenthusiastic about deficiency judgments because most of the
buyer's leviable goods consist of second-hand household effects and, even in states
where wages may be garnished, payments are received in dribbles.
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in the goods becomes more substantial.68 The best solution would seem
to be: (1) to give the buyer the option of compelling a public resale, taking
the risk of a deficiency judgment, when he has paid over a certain per-
centage, such as sixty percent of the purchase price; (2) to give the seller
the option of compelling a public resale and taldng a deficiency judgment,
if necessary, when less than such percentage of the purchase price has been
paid.869 It is true that only a small number of repossessions occur after
the buyer has paid a substantial amount of the original balance,70 because
the holder usually continues the contract. Thus the function of the sug-
gested buyer's option would be to protect buyers against the small minority




Modern installment sales statutes employ three types of sanctions to
enforce their provisions: licensing of finance companies and sellers, crim-
inal penalties for wilful violation of the acts, and civil remedies for the
buyer. Seven states have a licensing system under which the administra-
tor can revoke or refuse to issue licenses.7 2  Considering the general ig-
norance of buyers and the vast ameliorating task which these statutes
undertake, licensing and a supervisory agency are indispensable to their
effectiveness.78 Every state that has a licensing system also imposes a
criminal penalty upon any person or group that engages in installment
selling activities without having obtained a license. In addition penalties
68. Section 9-505 of the Uniform Commercial Code regards sixty percent as
being a substantial equity "in" the goods.
69. These options should be required to be clearly stated in the contract for the
information of the buyer. The buyer should be deemed to have exercised his option
to compel a public sale unless he has delivered to the contract holder a signed
statement waiving the option. Cf. U.C.C. §9-505(1).
70. The vast majority of defaults occur within the first three months after
purchase before fifty percent of the purchase price has been paid. See Adelson,
The Mechanics of the Instalment Credit Sale, 2 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRo. 218, 233
(1935). Hence, instances are rare in which a profit is made by the seller on a non-
statutory private resale, and he cannot make a profit on a statutory resale. U.C.S.A.
§21.
71. This protection is needed in states where a buyer with a substantial equity
in the goods is still powerless to force a public resale. E.g., PENNSYLVANIA, § 626
B gives seller complete discretion as to whether or not to have a public or private
sale in any case, and authorizes a deficiency judgment after either type of sale.
72. Some states license only automobile enterprises: MAINE, §264 (finance com-
panies) ; PExNSYL VANIA, § 604 (finance companies, installment sellers, and collector-
repossessors) ; WiscoNSiN, § 218.01 (2) (finance companies, dealers, salesmen, manu-
facturers, and distributors). The following states license all finance companies:
CoNNEcnrcuT, §5964(1); INDIANrA, §58-911; MARYLAND, §141; NEw JEnsEY,
§ 17:16 B 2(a).
73. In Pennsylvania several field agents are constantly at work investigating the
activities of licensees. Between October 1, 1950 and October 1, 1951, five hundred
and forty-six overcharges were discovered by the examiners in approximately forty
thousand contracts examined. There were over 307,000 contracts in existence during
this period. Information on the number of overcharges uncovered may be secured
from the Department of Banking of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
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are commonly imposed for a wilful violation of any provision of the act
including the furnishing of false or incorrect information requested by
the administrator.74
The several statutes vary as to the types of civil recovery afforded.
In Pennsylvania the buyer is given no recovery against the seller or
holder who violates a provision of the act. However, if the seller or
finance company is unlicensed the buyer may cancel the contract and
take the vehicle free of all liens by paying the cash price.7 The Ohio,
California and Maryland statutes permit the buyer to recover the entire
amount he has paid on the contract for certain types of statutory violations
by the seller.76 While these statutes are not clear as to the disposition
of the car, it would undoubtedly have to be returned, since the remedy
granted is of a restitutionary nature.77 Three states prescribe that the
seller merely forfeits the entire finance charge for certain statutory viola-
tions.78 This provision allows the buyer to retain the' goods and at the
same time avail himself of the penalty.
CONCLUSION
Most of the states that have enacted special legislation to cope with
the abuses in installment selling regulate all consumer goods.79 These
statutes provide the same rules and regulations for goods such as fur-
niture as they do for automobiles. The types of abuses in the sale of house-
hold goods are mainly the same as those in the automobile field. Hence,
in considering the desirability of extending the scope of the statutes now
limited to automobile sales, and in determining the desirable scope of stat-
utes to be enacted in the future, one major factor is the prevalence of auto-
mobile-sales abuses in other consumer goods areas.
Retailers of cheaper h6usehold commodities are more likely to finance
their own, sales than are automobile dealers. Thus, the furniture buyer
will only infrequently deal with an assignee finance company, whose con-
tract immunity from buyer's defenses against seller have caused trouble
in the automobile field. The household-goods seller is less inclined to re-
possess on default, because the resale value of used furniture and the like
74. E.g., MARYLAND, § 150; PENNSYLVANIA, § 637 B.
75. PENNSYLVANIA, § 635 A.
76. The Maryland statute permits the buyer to recover all payments made on
the contract if the seller fails to deliver a signed copy of the contract to the buyer
within fifteen days (§116(b)). In Stride v. Martin, 184 Md. 446, 41 A.2d 489
(1945), the buyer recovered all payments he had made because the seller failed to
sign the buyer's copy of the contract. OHIo, § 6346-22, provides that if the seller
overcharges the buyer the latter may recover the entire amount paid on the contract.
CALIFORNIA, §§2982(e) and (f) provide for recovery by the buyer of the amount
paid under the contract for certain violations of the statute.
77. See Estrada v. Alvarez, 38 Cal.2d 386, 240 P.2d 278 (1952) (plaintiff
sued on a rescission theory under CALIFORNIA, §§2982(e) and (f)).
78. CoNNEcricuT, § 6703; NEw JERsEY, § 17:16 B 9; MARYLAND, § 136.
79. Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Utah, Wisconsin.
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is proportionately far below that of a used car. And, to the extent that
default in automobile contracts is induced by mechanical defects, there is
less probability of default by buyers of non-mechanical commodities.
On the other hand, finance charges in the automobile field seem to
be no more exorbitant than those in other time-sales situations. There
are also two special factors which urge extra protection to the buyer of
household goods: the use of "add ons," 80 and the higher degree of em-
barrassment and inconvenience to the buyer when the seller repossesses.81
The conclusion is inescapable that, although the automobile buyer may
be slightly more in need of protection than the buyer of other consumer
goods, their situations are not essentially different. Hence, the above dis-
cussion of the efficacy of statutory attempts to control abuses in automobile
installment sales is largely of general applicability. The minimum require-
ments of any such statute should be: (1) a written contract apprising the
buyer of his rights and liabilities; (2) a maximum allowable interest
rate to be stated as an-annual percentage in the contract so that the buyer
may have some basis for comparison of costs; and (3) an option for
the buyer who has a substantial equity in the goods 8 2 to demand a resale
after a repossession.
80. If the buyer purchases additional goods from the seller before completing
payments under the first contract, the second contract provides for the consolidation
of the purchases. Later, upon default, the seller may repossess all the goods even
though the full amount of the original purchase has been paid. Some of the modern
sales statutes contain provisions forbidding or limiting the use of the "add on."
Forbidding: CoxN~rcuT, § 6699(a) 2; NEw JER sEY, § 17:16 B-6(a) (2); MASSA-
cHusLrrs, § 13B (household effects); WiscoNsIx, § 122.05(2) (household effects,
automobiles). Limiting: MARYLAND, § 124; NEW YoRic, § 81; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 69, § 512 (Purdon Supp. 1951) (applying only to bailment leases).
81. At least one state has felt the importance of this factor in the prior notice
situation. See text at note 58 supra.
82. See e.g., note 68 supra.
